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LEIBNIZ ON DIVINE FOREKNOWLEDGE

Robert Sleigh

Leibniz believed that his metaphysical system provided a structure acceptable to all Christian intellectuals of good will and sound reason, within which the leading issues of philosophical theology could be given a sharp formulation, and, at least in some cases, adequately resolved. In this paper, I discuss Leibniz's treatment of one such issue — God's foreknowledge of contingent truths, especially contingent truths concerning free actions of creatures. Leibniz aimed to provide an account of divine foreknowledge without recourse to middle knowledge, as espoused by Molina, or premotion, as espoused by Banez. I aim to provide an account of his account.

The point of this paper is to say something about Leibniz's account of God's foreknowledge of contingent truths, especially, contingent truths concerning free actions of creatures. By my lights the topic is intrinsically interesting, since it involves one of the best philosophical minds wrestling with a topic that has vexed philosophers and theologians from at least Augustine's time to the present. But beyond that, its study allows us some entry into the way in which Leibniz intermingled metaphysical and theological concerns in his total system, a matter of considerable importance to those of us who hope to understand that system and its rationale.

The topic of Leibniz's account of divine foreknowledge is too extensive for full treatment here. My aim is to block out some of the major items that need investigation. I do so by concentrating on the claim involved in the following passage, which concludes paragraph 47 of Leibniz's *Theodicy*:

in order to explain the foreknowledge of God, we can do without the middle knowledge of the Molinists, as well as predetermination of the sort that a Banez or an Alvarez (otherwise authors who are exceedingly profound) has taught.

The problem of God's foreknowledge of contingent truths concerning future free actions of creatures reached a crescendo in the famous *Congregatio de auxiliis* — really two congregations, one presided over by various Cardinals (1598-1601), followed by another presided over by various Popes (1602-1605). Of course there was much more at stake in the *Congregatio de auxiliis* than divergent views concerning God's foreknowledge of free actions of creatures, but divergent views on that topic — specifically, those associated with the Jesuit, Molina, on the one hand, and the Dominican, Banez, on the



other — were central to the controversy therein debated. In almost every text in which Leibniz wrote about the matter of God's foreknowledge of free actions of creatures Molina and Banez — or their respective 17th century successors — are in evidence. There were radical voices speaking to this problem in the 17th century: some who denied creaturely freedom, others who accepted creaturely free actions but who denied God's foreknowledge of them. When the occasion arose, Leibniz derisively separated himself from these radical voices, affirming the basic parameters of the problem common to Molina and Banez, among many others. In the first section of this paper I outline these basic parameters from Leibniz's point of view. In the second section I formulate the main elements of the debate between Molina and Banez, as Leibniz understood that debate. In the third section I discuss an accommodation that Leibniz was prepared to offer the Molinists concerning middle knowledge. I claim that the alleged accommodation would have been of little interest to the Molinists. In the fourth and fifth sections I discuss Leibniz's critical reaction to the positions of Banez and Molina, respectively. In the sixth (and last) section I consider Leibniz's account of divine foreknowledge of contingent counterfactual conditionals — a case that is particularly sticky for him.¹

I

A primary goal of Leibniz's philosophical theology was the formulation of a metaphysical structure acceptable to all Christian intellectuals of good will and sound reason, within which the leading issues of philosophical theology could be given a sharp formulation, and, at least in some crucial cases, adequately resolved.² Leibniz thought that the matter of God's foreknowledge of creaturely free acts was one such crucial case; that is, a crucial case where his metaphysics permitted sharp formulation of the issues and led to a resolution acceptable to all Christian intellectuals of good will and sound reason.

I begin by recording some theses of philosophical theology that Leibniz took to be non-negotiable, and, hence, shared by those Christian intellectuals of good will and sound reason to whom his work was directed. Given our topic the relevant theses bear on God's knowledge. He held that God is omniscient in the sense that, for any proposition with a truth value, God knows its truth value at all times.³ Thus, if it is now true that I am freely speaking then God always knew that I would now be freely speaking and, hence, God has foreknowledge of my freely speaking, and, indeed, of every free action of every creature. In virtue of God's perfection, his knowledge is in every case perfect knowledge, i.e., certain, infallible and apriori.⁴ In virtue of his independence from creatures, God is in no essential way dependent on them for his knowledge of them. These requirements are satisfied in virtue of the fact that all of God's knowledge is derived from self-knowledge, which,

in God, is certain, infallible, and apriori. Since we may legitimately think of God, although utterly simple, as yet having an intellect on the one hand, and volition on the other, all of God's self-knowledge may be thought of as either knowledge of his own intellect or knowledge of his own volition.⁵ Thus, we may usefully distinguish God's knowledge that is a consequence of his knowledge of his own volition from God's knowledge that is a consequence of his knowledge of his own intellect. We may call the former God's post-volitional knowledge, the latter, God's pre-volitional knowledge. Leibniz, following a well entrenched practice, referred to the former as God's knowledge of vision, the latter, as God's knowledge of simple intelligence. It is important to realize that, although Leibniz utilized the terminology of knowledge of vision, he insisted that God's so-called knowledge of vision is unlike our knowledge of vision, since in God's case, like all God's knowledge, it is derived from self-knowledge — see, for example, the passage quoted in footnote 5.

So much for what he took to be non-negotiable background. Now a sweeping characterization of Leibniz's contribution. Leibniz's global thesis concerning divine foreknowledge is that what needs to be said is a relatively straightforward elaboration of the following basic idea. There is an infinite collection of possible worlds, each represented in God's intellect by ideas that constitute compossible complete individual concepts.⁶ One of these possible worlds is actual in virtue of a single, free, world-actualizing divine decree — this possible world shall be actual. God's knowledge of simple intelligence consists in God's knowledge of the contents of each of these possible worlds. God's knowledge of vision is simply the increment in his knowledge that results when his knowledge of his own free, world-actualizing decree is added to his knowledge of simple intelligence.⁷

There are some elements of Leibniz's metaphysics that bear significantly on this central global thesis. Leibniz thought of each complete individual concept as containing properties sufficient to provide total information about some possible individual in some possible world. Not surprisingly he held that each complete individual concept is a member of exactly one possible world. Surprisingly, and significantly, he held that each possible individual is in exactly one possible world. Hence, for each possible individual *x* there is exactly one complete individual concept *C* providing total information about *x* in the one and only possible world *W* of which *x* is a member. One of Leibniz's reasons for maintaining that each possible individual is a member of exactly one possible world was his commitment to the thesis of superintrinsicness, i.e., for any individual substance *x* and property *f*, if *x* has *f*, then, for any *y*, were *y* to lack *f*, then *y* would not be *x*.⁸ And, while Leibniz accepted the doctrine of superintrinsicness, my view is that he rejected a doctrine naturally associated with it, namely, the doctrine of superessentialism, i.e., for any individual substance *x* and property *f*, if *x* has *f*, then, *x* has *f* of necessity. I claim that Leibniz maintained a traditional distinction be-

tween those properties that an individual has contingently and those that it has essentially, i.e., of necessity.⁹ He formulated the relevant distinction by applying the doctrine of infinite analysis to his theory of truth — the concept containment account of truth — in the following manner: an individual *x* has a property *f* essentially, i.e., of necessity, just in case there is a finite analysis of the complete individual concept *C* of *x* that yields *f*; and, an individual *x* has a property *f* contingently just in case there is no such analysis, but there is an analysis of *C* that converges on *f*.¹⁰

Three other Leibnizian doctrines that bear on our topic need to be noted — the principle of sufficient reason, the doctrine of marks and traces, and the principle of spontaneity. Roughly, the principle of sufficient reason is this: for each state of affairs that obtains, there is a sufficient reason why it obtains in just the manner in which it does obtain. The doctrine of marks and traces is this: each state of an individual substance includes traces of all that the substance has been and marks of all that the substance will be. And the principle of spontaneity is this: each non-initial, non-miraculous state of a substance is caused by some preceding state of that substance, in virtue of which all creaturely causality is intrasubstantial. Leibniz may have taken each of these doctrines to be a necessary truth.¹¹ In that case each would set limits on just what collections of properties can constitute a complete individual concept. Some of the resulting limits bear on our topic.

II

In this section I provide a brief, spare account of one aspect of the debate between Molina and Banez, as Leibniz understood that debate. My aim is to highlight just those features of each theory that Leibniz viewed as unwarranted.

Let us suppose that Paul freely converted to Christ under the influence of God's special grace. Consider then:

- 1) Paul freely converted to Christ.

We may suppose that there is a collection of states of affairs $C_1...C_n$ that constitutes God's causal contribution to the obtaining of the state of affairs corresponding to 1). And we may suppose that C_n constitutes that special grace relevant to Paul's conversion. Consider now:

- 2) If $C_1...C_n$ were to obtain then Paul would freely convert to Christ.

According to Molina, God's foreknowledge of 1) is based on God's post-volitional knowledge of his own relevant causal contributions to creation, here represented by the obtaining of $C_1...C_n$, plus his knowledge of the truth of 2).¹² Further, according to Molina, if the obtaining of $C_1...C_n$ either metaphysically or causally necessitates Paul's conversion, then that conver-

sion was not free.¹³ So, Molina held that Paul's not converting to Christ is both metaphysically and causally compatible with God's total causal contribution to creation up to, and including, the moment of Paul's conversion, God's special grace included. Molina concluded that the truth of 2) is not subject to God's volition and that, hence, it is a contingent truth that it is not known post-volitionally. It is an example of something known to God through his middle knowledge. On Molina's account, God's knowledge of 1) is based on his post-volitional knowledge of his causal contribution to creation, plus his knowledge of 2), through his middle knowledge.

Consider:

- 3) If $C_1...C_{n-1}$ were to obtain then Paul would freely convert to Christ.

According to Banez, if the obtaining of $C_1...C_{n-1}$ either metaphysically or causally necessitates Paul's conversion, then that conversion was not free.¹⁴ But, according to Banez, analogous remarks do not apply to 2), given that C_n constitutes God's special grace, premoving Paul's will. But, of course, God's dispensation of grace is subject to his volition. Hence, according to Banez, God's foreknowledge of 1) is based entirely on a knowledge of his own causal contribution to creation, and, hence, is garden-variety post-volitional knowledge — there is no need for middle knowledge, as characterized by Molina.¹⁵

Banez went further. He argued that middle knowledge, as required in Molina's theory — knowledge of what a creature will do freely in various circumstances — since it does not depend on God's volition in Molina's theory, must depend on the relevant creature. But this consequence is contrary to the non-negotiable requirements of an acceptable account of God's knowledge. Molina, in turn, criticized the idea that there is sometimes a premotion of the will such that it is metaphysically impossible for that premotion to occur and a specified choice not be made, and yet the choice in question is free.

III

In this section I begin an investigation of a topic that will occupy us throughout the paper — an assessment of Leibniz's attitude toward Molinism. It will become clear that an accurate assessment is no easy task. This is reflected by diverse assessments among contemporary Leibniz scholars. In a recent study of the *Monadology*, Nicholas Rescher wrote:

For reconciling free agency with divine foreknowledge, Leibniz in effect adopts the conception of middle knowledge (*scientia media*) deployed by the Spanish theologian Luis Molina.¹⁶

By contrast, in his study of the influence of Scotus's analysis of omniscience, Douglas Langston, after noting an objection to Molinism that Leibniz reported in paragraph 41 of the *Theodicy*, wrote:

Leibniz evidently takes this line of reasoning to be an effective critique of the Molinist position.¹⁷

For the benefit of the wary reader, I state my main conclusions on this matter up front. Leibniz clearly rejected Molina's account of freedom, an account that in large measure motivated Molina's appeal to middle knowledge. Leibniz also rejected the thesis that there is need for a special kind of divine insight — the so-called supercomprehension of the free will of created agents, as postulated by Molina — in order to account for divine knowledge of conditionals of freedom. Nonetheless, Leibniz made an effort to provide for a category of divine knowledge midway (so to speak) between knowledge of simple intelligence and knowledge of vision. Moreover, Leibniz claimed that propositions in the mid-way category are contingent and yet are not known to God post-volitionally — a claim that Molina accepted and Banez rejected. This accommodation to Molina is discussed in the present section; I argue that it would have been of little interest to Molina.

In the sequel I note that Leibniz sometimes claimed that even if (perhaps, per impossible) Molina's characterization of creaturely freedom were true, still, Leibniz's account of the structure of possible worlds represented in the divine understanding by collections of complete individual concepts provides the basis for an explanation of divine knowledge of conditionals of freedom without appeal to supercomprehension, or any other novel ingredient. So, I reject the idea that in paragraph 41 of the *Theodicy* Leibniz formulated what he there took to be an effective critique of Molinism. But I argue that a careful scrutiny of Leibniz's alleged accommodation shows that it turns on features of Leibniz's metaphysics that Molina would find unacceptable.

Let us concentrate on Leibniz's efforts to make room for a category of divine knowledge between knowledge of simple intelligence and knowledge of vision. In paragraphs 14-16 of *Causa Dei* Leibniz characterized the difference between knowledge of simple intelligence and knowledge of vision in terms of the modal status of the individuals that serve as the objects of each — possibles, in the case of simple intelligence, actuals in the case of vision. Leibniz began paragraph 17 by writing.

knowledge commonly called middle is included in knowledge of simple intelligence when it is set forth in this sense.¹⁸

But Leibniz went on in paragraph 17 to note that, rather than reduce middle knowledge to simple intelligence, we could make room for it as a separate category of divine knowledge midway between simple intelligence and vision by restricting the term 'knowledge of simple intelligence' to God's knowledge of necessary truths concerning possibles, while introducing 'middle knowledge' to refer to God's knowledge of contingent truths concerning possibles. This may appear to be a substantial concession to Molina. And there seem to be related concessions in the offing.

Consider the following propositions:

- 4) For any proposition *p*, if *p* is necessarily true then God knows *p* pre-volitionally.
- 5) For any proposition *p*, if *p* is contingently true then God knows *p* post-volitionally.

4) is not in dispute among those that concern us. 5), on the other hand, separates Molina from Banez, since Banez accepted 5) while Molina rejected it. And the fact is that Leibniz sided with Molina in this matter and rejected 5). In his reading notes on Twisse Leibniz wrote:

Nota bene: There are certain indemonstrable truths even in the case of possibles, namely, concerning contingent items seen as possibles.¹⁹

This passage may seem at odds with numerous other passages where Leibniz apparently committed himself to the claim that necessary truths depend upon the divine intellect and not the divine will, whereas contingent truths depend upon the divine will. Thus, in the essay "Necessary and Contingent Truths," Leibniz wrote:

. . . just as necessary truths involve only the divine intellect, so contingent truths involve the decrees of the will.²⁰

An examination of Leibniz's correspondence with Arnauld suggests to me that in passages like that just quoted Leibniz meant to affirm the following:

- 6) For any proposition *p*, if *p* is contingently true then God's knowledge of *p* depends upon God's knowledge of his own decrees, possible as well as actual.

And the same examination suggests to me that Leibniz rejected the following:

- 7) For any proposition *p*, if *p* is contingently true then God's knowledge of *p* depends upon God's knowledge of his own actual decrees.

Leibniz held that concepts of possible, but non-actual individuals included possible, but non-actual divine decrees, i.e., decrees that God would have actually made had he created the possible worlds to which the individuals in question belong. But since these possible decrees are included in the relevant concepts, i.e., in God's ideas, he knows them by simple intelligence, i.e., pre-volitionally.²¹

We may locate the central point here by focusing on some remarks in Leibniz's reading notes on Dole's *De modo conjunctionis concursuum Dei et creaturarum* (Lyon, 1634), concerning that famous test case utilized in so many treatises on middle knowledge — the question whether the residents of Keilah would have surrendered David to Saul, had David remained in Keilah and had Saul besieged Keilah. Leibniz noted that when we consider whether the residents of Keilah would have turned David over to Saul, had David

taken refuge in Keilah and had Saul then besieged the city, we must consider truths about possible residents of Keilah other than the actual residents of Keilah.²² In particular, we must consider possible but non-actual residents of Keilah whose concepts include the property of living in Keilah during David's refuge therein when Keilah was besieged by Saul. Let Dominic be one such, and let ^cDominic be his complete individual concept. A relevant question is: does ^cDominic include the property of playing a role in turning David over to Saul? Leibniz would argue that the analysis that establishes the answer to this question is infinite. Hence Dominic has (or lacks) the property of playing a role in turning David over to Saul contingently. But since Dominic never is actual there is no actual decree of God that is relevant to whether Dominic has the relevant property. Hence, 5) and 7) must be rejected. But, according to Leibniz, there is always some possible divine decree that is relevant to whether some possible individual has some property contingently. Hence 6) is acceptable.²³

There is nothing in this accommodation that would have been welcomed by Molina. Molina would have seen Leibniz's so-called accommodation as reflecting unacceptable idiosyncrasies in Leibniz's metaphysics that are irrelevant to the central point at issue here — how God can have foreknowledge of the free actions of creatures that is self-knowledge without God's bringing about the action in question in such fashion as to render it non-free. Notice, in particular, that Leibniz's grounds for denying 5) (at least, according to my exposition) are consistent with affirming that each free choice of a creature is such that, given God's causal contribution to creation prior to that choice, it is physically necessary that just that choice be made — a position that is deterministic in a way that even Banez would reject.

Note that there are two separate points here. There is the claim that Leibniz's so-called accommodation is irrelevant to the central topic; and there is the claim that it turns on unacceptable idiosyncrasies in Leibniz's metaphysics. I close this section by discussing the latter charge.

Leibniz would have claimed that the so-called "idiosyncrasies in his metaphysics" are required in order to formulate an acceptable philosophical theology. One point, in particular, is worth noting. In his reading notes on Twisse's *Scientia Media* Leibniz agreed with Twisse that Suarez's alleged proof that God foreknows future contingents is unacceptable, because circular. According to Twisse, Suarez argued that propositions about future contingents are known to God because they are knowable and God, in his omniscience, knows whatever is knowable. But, according to Twisse, Suarez had no ground for affirming that propositions about future contingents are knowable other than the claim that they are known by God. By contrast, Twisse, here in accord with Banez, argued that propositions about future contingents are known to God because he has, from all eternity, willed them to be true.²⁴

In his reading notes, Leibniz commented on Twisse's strategy as follows:

But in this matter Twisse himself does not satisfy because he holds that the [divine] decree is the basis (rationem) of its [the obtaining of some future contingent state of affairs] knowability. It is the efficient cause, but not the formal cause. The formal cause is the connection of terms, i.e., that the predicate is in the subject,...²⁵

Leibniz recorded a similar remark in the same reading notes, commenting on a point Twisse ascribed to Cajetan in the latter's commentary on article 13 of question 14 of the first part of St. Thomas's *Summa Theologica*, i.e., the question whether God's knowledge extends to future contingents. Cajetan's point is this: future contingents are not knowable on the basis of indeterminate, impedable causes, but they are available to God's omniscience because God knows which causes are impeded and which are not. Leibniz commented that since God knows future contingents prior to creation, when the relevant unimpeded causes did not even exist, "...the origin of the eternal knowability of the futurity of contingents must be sought from another source."²⁶ And that source is relevant cases of concept inclusion, as known to God in the divine intellect.

IV

We have noted Leibniz's major critical theme with respect to Molina and Banez. It is this. In order to satisfy the non-negotiable requirements concerning divine foreknowledge and creaturely freedom, shared by Christian intellectuals of good will and sound reason, Molina and Banez each introduced a novel theory. Molina introduced the theory of middle knowledge; Banez, the theory of an immediate premotion of the will. Leibniz's central point is that neither is needed; his own theory satisfies the non-negotiable requirements without employing these novel components — indeed, without employing any novel components not otherwise required by a sound metaphysics. What we need now is some detail.

Leibniz's major critical reaction to Banez is contained in the opening passages of paragraph 47 of the *Theodicy*, where Leibniz wrote:

There is no need to resort, with some new Thomists, to a new, immediate predetermination from God, which brings it about that the free creature abandons its indifference, and to a decree from God for predetermining it, which provides God the means of knowing what it will do; for it suffices that the creature is predetermined by its preceding state, which inclines it to one course more than to another...

On the basis of this passage the naive reader might suppose that Leibniz was a compatibilist and determinist with respect to creaturely free choice, and that he utilized his compatibilism with respect to causal determination and free choice to solve apparent problems concerning the compatibility of divine foreknowledge and human freedom. With some caveats this naive reading is the one I recommend.

Of the three notions involved here — compatibilism, freedom, and determinism — the latter presents numerous problems in the 17th century context.²⁷ Moreover, there are special difficulties that accrue in virtue of features of Leibniz's metaphysics. Here is an example. There is general agreement that Leibniz held that some actions of some creatures are free in virtue of occurring as a result of free choices of the relevant creatures. So those who do not ascribe compatibilism to Leibniz claim that he held that free choices are not determined, in the relevant sense. Yet the texts make clear that Leibniz subscribed to the thesis of superintrinsicness. Applied to the case in hand, superintrinsicness has the following consequence: suppose *x* is a creature who makes free choice *c* at time *t*; then had *x* not made choice *c* at *t*, *x* would never have existed in the first place. That sounds like strong determination. Those who deny that Leibniz was a compatibilist and determinist must say that this is not a relevant notion of determination. I am inclined to believe that anyone who thinks that determination in this sense is compatible with freedom, should have no difficulty accepting the compability of more garden variety notions of determination with freedom. Still, to be fair, we need a notion of determination characterized in terms of natural causation. Here is a rough characterization that will serve, I believe. A non-initial state *S* of a creature *x* is naturally determined if there is a sequence of natural conditions, the first of which is the initial state of *x*, and the last of which is *S*, where each element in the sequence is a state of *x* that is a causally sufficient condition of its successor in the sequence, with the exception of *S*, which has no successor in the sequence. My claim is that Leibniz's mature, settled opinion was that some free choices of some creatures are determined according to this characterization. We might call it natural determination. Note that I have concentrated on Leibniz's conception of a free choice rather than his conception of a free action. My reason for that is that Leibniz believed that free choice is where the action is when it comes to freedom. In particular, Leibniz saw the inadequacy of the idea that an action is free just in case that action is caused (in part) by a choice of the agent in such fashion that the action would not have occurred had the agent chosen otherwise. Commenting on a characterization of freedom drawn along these lines Leibniz wrote in a letter to Basnage (G/3/133):

Mr. Jaquelot ... says that freedom signifies a power to do what one wills, because one wills it in such fashion that if one had not willed it, one would not do it ... I believe that the most obstinate adversaries of human freedom are obliged to agree that we are free in this sense. I do not know, if even Spinoza would deny it.

In the *New Essays* (A/6/6/181), commentating on essentially the same notion of a free action, Leibniz wrote:

The question is not whether a man can do what he wills to do, but whether his will itself is sufficiently independent.

It is natural to suppose that Leibniz held that the will is "sufficiently independent" for freedom, although naturally determined. The determinist claim appears to be a straightforward consequence of Leibniz's principle of spontaneity.²⁸ Here is a carefully crafted version of the principle of spontaneity, formulated by Leibniz in the correspondence with Arnauld:

Everything happens in each substance in consequence of the first state that God gave it in creating it, and, extraordinary concurrence aside, his ordinary concurrence consists simply in the conservation of the substance itself, in conformity with its preceding state and with the changes that it carries with it.²⁹

I am supposing that Leibniz held that the changes that the preceding state of a substance "carries with it" (*'changemens qu' il porte'*) are, in the case of God's ordinary concurrence, brought about by natural causation, even in the case of free choices.³⁰ There are numerous texts that would naturally suggest this supposition to the naive reader (of whom I have already confessed to be one).³¹

However, there are a number of considerations that point in another direction, suggesting that Leibniz was an incompatibilist who accepted some libertarian version of agency theory. There are a number of texts favoring this interpretation, none more egregious (from my point of view) than the following from "Necessary and Contingent Truths":

Free or intelligent substances have something greater [than stones] and more marvelous in a kind of imitation of God, so that they are not bound by any certain subordinate laws of the universe, but act as if by a private miracle, on the sole spontaneity of their own power, and, in consideration of some final cause, they interrupt the nexus and course of efficient causes on their own will. So it is true that there is no creature that knows the heart who could predict with certainty how some mind will choose in accordance with the laws of nature. . . . From this it can be understood what is that indifference that goes with freedom. Just as contingency is opposed to metaphysical necessity, so indifference excludes not only metaphysical but also physical necessity.³²

It is at once the comfort and bane of exegetical scholarship that no matter what the text, there is almost always some room to maneuver, if some pet interpretation is at stake. And, there really is room to maneuver here. Nonetheless, all things considered, if I thought that this passage represented Leibniz's mature, settled view, I would be inclined to throw in the towel.

Note that whatever account of freedom Leibniz intended to promote in this passage, he claimed as a consequence of it that no creature supplied with knowledge of the relevant initial conditions and with knowledge of the laws of nature "...could predict with certainty how some mind will choose." There are other passages where Leibniz made essentially the same point.³³ In these

passages Leibniz maintained that, at least for most of us, most of the time, whatever the circumstances that obtain prior to our making a decision, we can, if we choose, suspend our deliberative process and make no decision. Leibniz then argued that this power of suspension of the deliberative process makes it impossible for a created mind, unaided by God, to know infallibly in advance what a free agent will do.³⁴ The idea that we have this power of suspending deliberation survives in Leibniz's writing after 1700, but the thesis that it produces unpredictability is not to be found. Indeed, the relevant texts seem to suggest that Leibniz then regarded suspension as causally ordered in much the same fashion as any other choice is.³⁵

The real difficulty presented by the "private miracle" passage is the claim that free creatures may "...interrupt the ... course of efficient causes," and that therefore freedom consists not only in a lack of metaphysical necessity, but, more significantly, in an indifference that results from a lack of physical necessity. And it is exactly this claim that by my lights, Leibniz denied in his writings on freedom after 1700. Thus, in the preface to the *Theodicy*, touting the virtues of what was to come, Leibniz wrote:

It will be shown that absolute necessity, which is called also logical and metaphysical, and sometimes geometric, *and which alone is to be feared*, does not exist in free actions, and, hence, that freedom is exempt not only from constraint, but also from real necessity. [G/6/37(Huggard 61), underlining mine.]

This is not a stray passage; its point occurs in numerous other texts — as a small sample, see T §§ 44, 302, 367; G/3/401(A+G 194); and Grua 480-81. I take Leibniz's point to be that only metaphysical necessity, not natural necessity, serves as a threat to freedom; that is, that natural, or physical necessity, unlike metaphysical necessity, is compatible with freedom.

The exegetical scholar who ascribes libertarianism to Leibniz may be unmoved by this passage and my gloss on it, noting that it is a question of exactly what is said to have or to lack necessity. I take the following passage from a 1707 letter from Leibniz to Coste on freedom to come close to settling the matter my way:

When we propose a choice to ourselves, for example, whether to leave or not, it is a question whether, with all the circumstances, internal or external, motives, perceptions, dispositions, impressions, passions, inclinations taken together, I am still in a state of contingency, or whether I am necessitated to take the choice to leave, for example, i.e., whether in fact this true and determined proposition — in all these circumstances taken together, I will choose to leave — is contingent or necessary. I reply that it is contingent, because neither I nor any other more enlightened mind could demonstrate that the opposite of this truth implies a contradiction. And assuming that by freedom of indifference we understand a freedom opposed to necessity (as I have just explained it), I agree with that freedom.³⁶

Note that in order for the choice to be free Leibniz herein required only that the relevant conditional lack metaphysical necessity. There is no requirement that it lack physical necessity. And the clear suggestion of the passage (and the entire letter) is that that is all the indifference Leibniz was then prepared to admit.³⁷

I am aware that the compatibilism that I ascribe to Leibniz was an uncommon view in his time. Arnauld strongly criticized Malebranche for holding that an action might be free and yet "...a necessary consequence of the order of nature..."³⁸ Arnauld associated the thesis that all creaturely actions are a necessary consequence of the order of nature, "...a necessary consequence of natural laws..." with the heresy of John Wyclif.³⁹

I think that it is instructive that Leibniz had a quite different reading of Wyclif; at T § 67 he wrote:

I am very far from the views of Bradwardine, Wyclif, Hobbes and Spinoza, who advocate, so it seems, this entirely mathematical necessity...

So Leibniz deplored the necessity he took Wyclif to have advocated in connection with the actions of creatures, and he would have agreed with Arnauld that necessity as understood by Wyclif is not compatible with freedom, but the notion of necessity deplored is not the one Arnauld had in mind.

I am inclined to put matters this way: Leibniz saw more clearly than those Christian philosophers who were his contemporaries or who preceded him that a deep understanding of the elements of Christian philosophical theology yields a series of serious problems concerning the claim that some states of affairs obtain contingently. He thought that we ought to devote our intellectual energy to solving those problems and then utilize natural compatibilism to finesse less threatening concerns.⁴⁰

V

Leibniz focused his critical attention on two aspects of Molina's account: i) Molina's conception of the conditions required for a creaturely action to be free; and ii) Molina's theory of the foundation of God's knowledge of 2) and its ilk, i.e., what came to be called God's supercomprehension of the free, created will.

i) *On Molina on Freedom.*

Consider the account of freedom Molina offered in Disputation 2 of the *Concordia*:

...that agent is said to be free, who, all the requisites for acting having been posited, can act or not act, or so perform one action that he is still able to do the contrary.⁴¹

In notes concerning a conversation on the topic of the problem of evil, after a careful formulation of the principle of sufficient reason, Leibniz set out to criticize Molina's account of freedom. He wrote:

This notion of freedom — that is, the power of acting or not acting, all the requisites for acting having been posited, and all things being equal both in the object and in the agent, is an impossible chimera, which is contrary to the first principle that I stated.⁴²

Then, after claiming that this account of freedom is not to be found in Aristotle, Augustine, the Master of Sentences, Thomas, Scotus, and most of the older Scholastics, he added:

It was given currency for the first time by the later Scholastics.⁴³

In an earlier version Leibniz wrote 'by the Molinists' in place of 'by the later Scholastics.' There is no doubt that we are in the neighborhood of his major objection to Molina's libertarian account of freedom. And the objection is straightforward: The principle of sufficient reason implies that the conditions required for freedom by Molina can not be satisfied and, hence, that the Molinist account of freedom is inconsistent.

Leibniz often formulated this criticism by stating that the Molinist conception of freedom requires an indifference of equipoise, which is inconsistent with the principle of sufficient reason.⁴⁴ It is easy to suppose that Leibniz's criticism misses the mark here. A comparison of Molina's conception of freedom, as formulated in the *Concordia*, with the account attributed to him by Leibniz, shows that they differ in that Molina's account contains no mention of equipoise, i.e., of all things being equal in the object and the agent — precisely the point on which Leibniz appears to have focused his criticism. But I think an examination of some of Leibniz's most carefully crafted criticisms shows that the target is Molina's account of freedom, unfettered by a requirement of equipoise. Leibniz characterized a sufficient cause or reason for the obtaining of some state of affairs α as a total set of requisites for the obtaining of α . The principle of sufficient reason requires that, if α obtains, there is a sufficient cause or reason why it obtains. Leibniz also held that if a sufficient reason or cause for some state of affairs α obtained, then α obtains. Put these items together with Molina's characterization of freedom and it is clear why Leibniz regarded it as an impossible chimera. The equipoise feature is irrelevant to this criticism. Perhaps, when Leibniz leaned on the equipoise feature in his criticism of Molina's account of freedom, what he had in mind is this: Molina's account of freedom implies the possibility of equipoise; but, since equipoise is impossible, Molina's account of freedom is unacceptable.⁴⁵

ii) *On Molina on God's Supercomprehension of the Created Will.*

In paragraph 41 of the *Theodicy*, Leibniz considered some of the standard objections to middle knowledge, as employed by Molina. He wrote:

. . .the principal objection goes against the foundation of this knowledge. For what foundation can God have for seeing what the residents of Keilah would do? A simple, contingent and free act has nothing in itself that can provide a principle of certainty, unless it is regarded as predetermined by the decrees of God, and by the causes that depend on them. ... Therefore, it would be necessary to reduce everything to the predetermination of the decrees of God, and, hence, this middle knowledge (so it will be said) will remedy nothing.

It is tempting to suppose that Leibniz was not only reporting a standard objection to Molina's understanding of middle knowledge, i.e., the objection that there can be no such knowledge because there is no foundation for it — but subscribing to it as well. The same objection appears to surface in other passages, where Leibniz was stating his own position. After noting that King's account of freedom involves unacceptable indifference, Leibniz wrote:

He [King] is also greatly embarrassed with respect to the foreknowledge of God. For if the soul is perfectly indifferent in its choice, how is it possible to foresee this choice, and what sufficient reason can be found for the knowledge of a thing, if there is none for its existence?⁴⁶

But these passages must be contrasted with those in which Leibniz seemed to claim that even if the human will were subject to unacceptable indifference, of the variety Leibniz took Molina and King to advocate, still Leibniz's account of the structure of possible worlds represented in the divine understanding by collections of complete individual concepts would provide an acceptable basis for middle knowledge. Consider two samples. The first is from paragraph 42 of the *Theodicy*. After touting the virtues of his way of thinking about possible worlds, Leibniz wrote:

For even if it were true and possible that future contingents that consist in the free actions of reasonable creatures were entirely independent of the decrees of God and of external causes, there would be a means of foreseeing them: for God would see them just as they are in the region of possibles, before he would decree to admit them to existence.

And consider the following passage from paragraph 364 of the *Theodicy*, where Leibniz had his final say on Molinism in the *Theodicy*:

. . .the Socinians can not be excused for denying to God certain knowledge of future matters, and especially the future decisions of a free creature. For even though they supposed that there is a freedom of complete indifference, so that the will can choose without ground [sujet], and that thus this effect could not be seen in its cause (which is a great absurdity), they must always consider that God was able to foresee this event in the idea of the possible world that he decided to create.

I think that Leibniz was simply reporting an objection in paragraph 41 of the *Theodicy*, and not subscribing to it. I offer two pieces of evidence, neither anywhere near conclusive. First, in the very next paragraph — as our quotation

displays — Leibniz took what appears to be a quite different position. Second, the ‘so it will be said’ in parentheses is a standard device that Leibniz employed to indicate that he was just reporting.⁴⁷ The passage quoted from Leibniz’s commentary on King is more troublesome. My suggestion is that when Leibniz posed the questions “...how is it possible to foresee this choice, and what sufficient reason can be found for the knowledge...” he was repeating himself — in essence, asking just one question. Leibniz wrote:

...to know something is to know the truth of a proposition, and indeed to know the truth of a proposition is to know why it will be thus. Therefore, if God perfectly foresees a thing, he will foresee not only what will be, but why it will be...⁴⁸

Leibniz formulated the point as a criticism of the theory advocated by Molina in paragraph 320 of the *Theodicy*. For Leibniz, perfect knowledge of a truth — the kind of knowledge God has — involves knowledge of why that proposition is true. But given Molina’s account of freedom, Leibniz argued, there would be truths where there is no account of why these propositions are true. But that criticism is simply a repeat of Leibniz’s big criticism that Molina’s account of freedom is inconsistent with the principle of sufficient reason. If, per impossible (as Leibniz would put it), Molina’s libertarian theory is correct, then there may be truths where there is no sufficient reason to know, and, hence, so far, no separate objection to Molina’s account of God’s foreknowledge of the likes of 2). And, indeed, I take it that in paragraphs 42 and 364 of the *Theodicy*, quoted above, Leibniz claimed he had the conceptual apparatus to account for the relevant middle knowledge, even if, per impossible, Molina’s libertarian theory were true. Let’s see.

Consider the following:

- 8) Had David remained in Keilah and had Saul besieged Keilah, then Luis (the mayor of Keilah) would have freely chosen to turn David over to Saul.

Suppose that 8) is true and that Molina’s libertarian account of freedom is correct. Still, according to Leibniz in paragraph 42, he can account for God’s knowledge of 8) without appeal to anything other than what is required in order to account for any item of God’s knowledge of simple intelligence. Leibniz wrote:

For this result I come to my principle of an infinity of possible worlds, represented ... in the divine intelligence, where all future conditionals must be included. For the case of the siege of Keilah is part of a possible world that differs from ours only in all that is connected with this hypothesis, and the idea of this possible world represents what would happen in this case.

We might think of this as Leibniz’s loose and popular account of divine knowledge of counterfactual conditionals of freedom such as 8). It seems to

go this way. Let W_{actual} be the initial segment of the actual world from creation through David's decision not to remain in Keilah. Let W_i be an initial segment of a possible world W_i , where W_i and W_{actual} are exactly alike with respect to hard facts except that in W_i David decides to remain in Keilah, and Saul besieges Keilah and any other changes required by these assumptions. Leibniz's loose and popular account appears to assume that there is just one possible world — W_i — that has as initial segment the hard facts of W_i . And God knows whether 8) is true simply by noting whether Luis freely chooses to turn David over to Saul in W_i — a simple matter of God's taking heed of the complete individual concept of Luis, or his stand-in in W_i .

Molina would object to this construction, insisting that there are two distinct possible worlds W_i and W_j , each with initial segments W_i and W_j that are alike with respect to hard facts, i.e., each like W_{actual} except that in each David decides to remain in Keilah and Saul besieges Keilah. Luis freely chooses to turn David over to Saul in one, and freely chooses to do otherwise in the other. And, indeed, this situation is what generates the need for middle knowledge, since God's knowledge of simple intelligence, — his knowledge of what each individual does in each possible world — leaves it unsettled whether 8) is true or false.

Leibniz would respond to Molina's objection by maintaining that the doctrine of marks and traces precludes the existence of two possible worlds alike up to and including David's decision to remain in Keilah and Saul's besieging Keilah, and differing thereafter with respect to what Luis freely chooses to do with respect to David and Saul. The doctrine of marks and traces — in the strong form required to serve Leibniz's purposes here — is intimately related to the thesis of superintrinsicness. Perhaps, they are equivalent in the presence of other doctrines Leibniz accepted.⁴⁹ But, in an obvious way, acceptance of the thesis of superintrinsicness raises problems about what sense, if any, Leibniz can ascribe to counterfactuals like 8). So the very conceptual tools that Leibniz would have deployed in order to firm up his loose and popular account of God's knowledge of 8) raise serious questions concerning what sense, if any, Leibniz can ascribe to 8). One would expect that there is a strict and philosophical account of the matter somewhere in the Leibnizian texts. There is; it is the subject of the next section.

VI

Let's engage in some damage control. We know the general thesis that Leibniz liked with respect to divine knowledge. It is this: God's knowledge is the union of his knowledge of simple intelligence and his knowledge of vision, where the latter results from the former by adding to it God's knowledge of his own world — actualizing decree. By Leibniz's lights it is only *counterfactual* conditionals that threaten the general thesis. He would claim that

factual conditionals, including factual conditionals of freedom, pose no special problem at all. We might expect him to bite the bullet at this point and argue that his metaphysics establishes that counterfactual conditionals are without sense and that, hence, the general thesis survives, utterly unscathed. That was not his course, and I think it is clear why. The costs with respect to his own orthodoxy and his church reunion project were simply too high. Leibniz noted that sacred scripture takes counterfactual conditionals, and divine knowledge thereof, seriously, including I Samuel, chapter 23 verses 11 and 12, i.e., the classic case involving David, Saul, and the ungrateful residents of Keilah.⁵⁰ Not to do the same was not a viable option, given Leibniz's efforts to be orthodox and his church reunion goals.

Consider the following passage from Leibniz's reading notes on Twisse, in which his strict and philosophical account of counterfactual conditionals is on display:

Very often, future conditionals are senseless things. Thus, if I ask what would have happened if Peter had not denied Christ, I am asking what would happen if Peter were not Peter, for denying is contained in the complete concept of Peter. Nevertheless it is excusable that, on this occasion, by the name Peter is understood what is involved in those things [attributes of Peter] from which the denial does not follow, and at the same time there is subtracted from the entire universe all those things *from which it does follow*. And then sometimes it can happen that a decision follows per se from the remaining things posited in the universe. But sometimes it does not follow unless a new divine decree occurs based on the rule of the best. If there is no natural chain or succession from the remaining things posited, then it is not possible to know what will happen except on the basis of a decree of God in accord with what is best. Therefore, the matter depends either on the series of causes, or on a decree of the divine will. They do not seem to gain anything at all by means of middle knowledge.⁵¹

There is much that might be said about this striking passage, concerning Leibniz's reconstruction of counterfactual conditionals. Our focus is on its implications for Leibniz's account of God's knowledge of those conditionals. As the last sentence of the quotation suggests, there is nothing here to mollify the Molinist. After removing relevant items from Peter's complete concept and making associated adjustments to our conception of the rest of the universe, we first determine whether what remains is sufficient to causally determine a truth value for the consequent of the relevant conditional; if not, then we need to know what God would have willed in those circumstances. Of course, it is likely to be temerarious for us to say what God would have willed in those circumstances; but it is God's knowledge that concerns us here, not ours. The clear implication of Leibniz's reconstruction seems to be that God's knowledge of contingent counterfactual conditionals about actual individuals — including contingent counterfactual conditionals of freedom

— is post-volitional in the sense that it depends either on God's knowledge of his actual decrees (which determine the causal connections in the world) or on his knowledge of what he would have willed in various counterfactual circumstances.⁵²

Nor is there anything here of benefit to the Banezian. There is no reason at all to suppose that in the case where determination of a truth value for a counterfactual conditional requires knowledge of what God would have decreed, Leibniz had in mind anything like a premotion as postulated by Banez. More likely, Leibniz had in mind a divine decree of a natural law to cover the gaps engendered by Leibniz's recipe for making sense of contingent counterfactual conditionals.

This completes my survey of Leibniz on divine foreknowledge. No doubt there is more to be said, particularly concerning Leibniz's conception of the relation of God's knowledge to God's concurrence in creaturely actions. And there are topics delineated in this paper that deserve a more thorough treatment, e.g., the place of possible free decrees in Leibniz's thought, his conception of human freedom, and his claim that a divine decree may be the efficient cause, but not the formal cause of the knowability [scibilitatis] of a future contingent proposition.⁵³

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NOTES

1. The following abbreviations are used in citations:

- A = German Academy of Science, ed. *Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz: Sämtliche Schriften und Briefe*. Darmstadt, Leipzig, and Berlin, 1923-. Cited by series and volume.
- A+G = G. W. Leibniz — *Philosophical Essays*. Edited and translated by Roger Ariew and Daniel Garber. Indianapolis and Cambridge. Hackett Publishing Company, 1989.
- C = Louis Couturat, ed. *Opuscles et fragments inédits de Leibniz*. Paris, 1903. Reprint. Hildesheim: Georg Olms, 1966.
- Causa Dei* = G. W. Leibniz. *Causa Dei*. Cited by section number as given in G/6/437-460; translated by Paul Schrecker in (ed.) Schrecker and Schrecker: *Leibniz: Monadology and other Philosophical Essays*. New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., 1985: 114-145.
- Concordia* = Luis de Molina. *Liberi Arbitrii cum Gratiae Donis, Divina Praescientia, Providentia, Praedestinatione et Reprobatione Concordia*. Edited by Johann Rabeneck, S. J. Ona and Madrid, 1953; Part IV of the *Concordia* is translated by Alfred J. Freddoso, Luis de Molina, *On Divine Foreknowledge*. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1988.
- DM = G. W. Leibniz. *Discourse on Metaphysics*. Cited by section number as in G/4/427-63 and as translated by Peter G. Lucas and Leslie Grint. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1961.

- FC = G. W. Leibniz. *Nouvelles lettres et opuscules inédits*. Edited by Louis Alexandre Foucher de Careil. Paris, 1857. Reprint. Hildesheim: Georg Olms, 1971.
- G = *Die philosophischen Schriften von G. W. Leibniz*. Edited by C. J. Gerhardt. 7 volumes. Berlin, 1875-189. Reprint. Hildesheim: Georg Olms, 1965. Cited by volume.
- Grua = *G. W. Leibniz — Textes inédits*. Edited by Gaston Grua. 2 volumes. Paris, 1948. Reprint. New York and London: Garland, 1985.
- L = *G. W. Leibniz: Philosophical Papers and Letters*. Edited and translated by Leroy Loemker. 2d ed. Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1969.
- LA = The Leibniz-Arnauld correspondence. Cited by page number as in G/2/11-138, and as translated by H. T. Mason. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1967. The Mason translation has the Gerhardt pagination in the margins.
- LH = Eduard Bodemann. *Die Leibniz-Handschriften der Königlichen öffentlichen Bibliothek zu Hannover*. Hannover, 1889. Reprint. Hildesheim: Georg Olms, 1966.
- MP = *G. W. Leibniz — Philosophical Writings*. Edited and translated by Mary Morris and G. H. R. Parkinson. London: Dent, 1973.
- NE = G. W. Leibniz. *New Essays on Human Understanding*. Cited by page number in A/6/6. Translated by Peter Remnant and Jonathan Bennett (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981). The Remnant and Bennett translation employs the pagination of A/6/6.
- T = G. W. Leibniz. *Theodicy*. Cited by section number as in G/6. Translated by E. M. Huggard, *Theodicy*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1952. Reprint. LaSalle, Ill.: Open Court, 1985.
- Tractatus* = Dominic Banez. "Tractatus de vera et legitima concordia liberi arbitrii creati cum auxiliis gratiae Dei efficaciter moventis humanam voluntatem," in *Commentarios ineditos a la prima secundae de santo Tomas*, 3, ed. V. B. deHeredia, Madrid, 1948: 351-420.
- VE = *Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz — Vorauausedition zur Reihe VI — Philosophischen Schriften — in der Ausgabe der Akademie der Wissenschaften der DDR*. Prepared by the Leibniz — Forschungsstelle of the Universität Münster. 1982-1991. Since VE is not available in libraries or bookstores I have followed each VE citation by a reference to LH.

Each citation includes a reference to a source containing the cited passage in the original language, followed by a citation in parentheses containing a published translation of the passage into English, where such a translation is available. In the case of quoted passages the English translation cited may not match the translation displayed.

2. For careful studies of Leibniz's interest in and contributions to the project of church reunion, see Paul Eisenkopf, *Leibniz und die Einigung der Christenheit*. Munich, Paderborn and Vienna: Verlag Ferdinand Schöningh, 1975; and Jean Baruzi, *Leibniz et l'organisation religieuse de la Terre*. Paris: Felix Alcan, 1907. Reprint Aalen: Scientia Verlag, 1975.

3. See, for example, Grua 306 for "De Libertate, Fato, Gratia Dei," in which Leibniz wrote: God is omniscient, and so no intelligible proposition can be formed concerning which he does not know for certain whether it is true or false. And not only past and present matters, but also future contingents, and not only absolute, but also conditioned matters are known to him.

4. See *Causa Dei* § 13; VE 2534 and 2544 (LH I 3, 7c bl 1-4) and C26-27; and C17(MP97).

5. See FC 184 (MP111), which contains the following passage:

...contingent truths...are known by God, not indeed by demonstration (which would imply a contradiction), but nevertheless by an infallible vision. However, the vision of God must certainly not be conceived as a kind of experiential knowledge, as if he saw something in things distinct from himself, but rather as a priori cognition based on the reasons for truths, inasmuch as he sees things on account of himself, possibles through a consideration of his own nature, and, on the other hand, exists through the additional consideration of his own free will and decrees... . What is called middle knowledge is nothing other than the knowledge of contingent possibles.

6. See chapter IV "Possible Worlds" of Benson Mates's *The Philosophy of Leibniz* (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986) for a marvelous exposition of the relevant ideas and ample references to supporting texts.

7. See, for example, *Causa Dei* §§ 16, 42; T §§ 52, 84, and 363. In paragraph 16 of *Causa Dei* Leibniz wrote:

His knowledge of actuals, i.e., of the world brought into existence, and of all things in it, past, present, and future, is called knowledge of vision. And it does not differ from his knowledge of simple intelligence of this same world, considered as possible, other than that the reflexive knowledge, by which God knows his own decree to produce this very world into existence, is added. No other foundation of divine foreknowledge is needed.

8. See, for example, LA 42, 53; DM 30; G/7/311(MP78); Grua 314; T § 414.

9. For a defense of this claim, see section four of chapter four of R. C. Sleight, Jr., *Leibniz and Arnauld — A Commentary on their Correspondence* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1990). For an opposing view, see Fabrizio Mondadori, "Understanding Supersensationalism," *Studia Leibnitiana*, 1985: 162-190.

10. For some detail concerning the doctrine of infinite analysis, see section eight of chapter four of Sleight, *ibid.* For yet more detail, see R. C. Sleight, Jr., "Truth and Sufficient Reason in the Philosophy of Leibniz," in Michael Hooker (ed.), *Leibniz: Critical and Interpretive Essays*. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1982): 209-42.

11. In a paper entitled "Demonstratio Propositionum Primarum" (A/6/2/479-86) Leibniz set out what he intended as a demonstration of the principle of sufficient reason. (See A/6/2/483 and for a translation of it see R. C. Sleight, Jr., "Leibniz on the Two Great Principles of All our Reasoning," in Peter A. French, Theodore E. Uehling, Jr., and Howard K. Wettstein, eds. *Contemporary Perspectives on the History of Philosophy*. Midwest Studies in Philosophy, vol. 8, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1983: 203-4.) If successful, this demonstration would establish that the principle of sufficient reason is a necessary truth. "Demonstratio Propositionum Primarum" was written in 1671 or 1672, but essentially the same line of reasoning may be found in texts from Leibniz's maturity — see, for example, paragraph 18 of Leibniz's fifth letter to Clarke (G/7/393 (H. G. Alexander, ed. *The Leibniz — Clarke Correspondence*, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1956: 60)), and § 14 of Leibniz's essay on King's "On the Origin of Evil" (G/6/413-14 (Huggard 418-19)).

In a letter to De Volder, Leibniz formulated the doctrine of marks and traces and wrote

of it: "This is the most certain nature of every substance." (G/2/251(L530)). And, in another letter to De Volder, Leibniz said that satisfying the doctrine of marks and traces is essential to a substance. (G/2/282(L539)).

12. See, for example, *Concordia* 339-41 (Freddoso 168-69).

13. See, for example, *Concordia* 294 (Freddoso 86-87).

14. See *Tractatus* 357. Banez therein commented on Molina's famous characterization of freedom located in *Concordia* 14, where Molina wrote:

...that agent is said to be free who, all the requisites for acting having been posited, can act or not act, or so perform one action that he is still able to do the contrary.

Banez noted that whether this account is acceptable or not turns on how we understand the phrase "all the requisites for acting having been posited." Banez claimed that Molina's characterization is acceptable only if the requisites posited are those that obtain prior to the relevant free exercise of the will. On Banez's view, God's special grace, here a promotion of the exercise of the will is simultaneous with the exercise of the will. He wrote:

If however they [Molina and his allies] understand their definition as concerning the requisites obtaining at the moment in which the free act is exercised, it is proven false that, all these having been posited, it is compossible that the man not choose that good that God prescribes or advises, because one of the requisites is the actual divine motion by which the will is moved from not willing to willing.

15. *Tractatus* 419-20.

16. Nicholas Rescher, *G. W. Leibniz's Monadology* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1991): 149.

17. Douglas Langston, *God's Willing Knowledge* (University Park and London. The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1986): 78.

18. Leibniz's idea that middle knowledge is reducible to knowledge of simple intelligence also may be found in the following texts: VE 2618 (LH I 9, 387) and LH I XVIII, 22. These texts are to be compared with a passage in Leibniz's reading notes on Twisse where he wrote:

I hold that middle knowledge is included under knowledge of vision. (Grua 349)

I believe that the differences here are primarily terminological. Usually when Leibniz characterized varieties of divine knowledge the starting point for the distinctions was the modal status of the individuals known with purely possible individuals falling under simple intelligence and actual individuals under vision. But sometimes Leibniz used as his starting point the modal status of the propositions known, coupled with the thesis that necessary truths fall under simple intelligence and contingent truths under vision — see, for example, FC184(MP111). Either starting point will permit an adjustment for middle knowledge. We have just seen how this is accomplished under the first approach. Here is a text from his reading notes on Twisse in which Leibniz brought about the same adjustment, commencing with the second approach:

Knowledge is twofold, of demonstrables and of indemonstrables; knowledge of indemonstrables is either middle, or of vision, the former of possibles, the latter of actuals. (Grua 350).

In this passage, commencing with a division based on whether the propositions known are necessary (demonstrable) or contingent (indemonstrable), Leibniz subdivided the latter into two categories — those concerning pure possibles (middle knowledge); and those concerning actuals (knowledge of vision). Leibniz would claim that the two ways of accommodating middle knowledge yield the same results.

19. Grua 353.

20. C23(MP 104).

21. LA 40, 51.

22. VE 2618 (LH I 9 B1 387).

23. There is another line of reasoning worthy of notice that leads from premisses Leibniz accepted to the conclusion that there are contingent propositions not subject to God's actual will, although, to the best of my knowledge, he never formulated the corresponding argument.

Consider the proposition expressed by the sentence 'this possible world is the best possible world,' where 'this' is taken as referring to the actual world. So construed, Leibniz believed that the proposition thereby expressed is true. It is crucial to one of his main strategies for preserving contingency that the proposition thereby expressed is contingent. But Leibniz was sharply opposed to the idea that what is best is subject to God's will — see, for example, DM § 2. Hence, it is central to one of Leibniz's main strategies for preserving contingency that there are contingent propositions whose truth values are not subject to God's actual will.

24. See Guilelmus Twisse. *Dissertatio de scientia media*. Arnhem, 1639: 248. For Leibniz's reading notes, see Grua 351.

25. Grua 351. The same point may be found in LHI XVIII, 31.

26. Grua 353.

27. The notion of a determination of a truth-value for a proposition (or the obtaining of a state of affairs) was used in a bewildering variety of ways in the 17th century. In Leibniz's case (which is not atypical), it is important to distinguish among theological, semantical, conceptual, metaphysical, and physical determinations — at a minimum. Not to do so — to barge in unarmed with the relevant distinctions — is likely to yield a farrago.

28. For a critique of the view I support here and an ingenious defense of an alternative understanding of Leibniz, see R. Cranston Paull, "Leibniz and The Miracle of Freedom," *Nous*, Vol. XXVI, No. 2, June, 1992: 218-235.

29. LA 91-92.

30. For Cranston Paull's subtle alternative reading, see *op. cit.*: 228-29.

31. See, for example, G/6/37 (Huggard 61); T §§ 43, 305, 360, 369; G/3/401 (A+G 194); Grua 482.

32. C20-21 (MP 100-101).

33. See C20 (MP 100), and also Grua 301, 385-86, and *Causa Dei* 105.

34. See the texts noted in footnote 33. Grua 385-86 contains a particularly complex treatment of this issue.

35. See, for example, A/6/6/195-96; Grua 480-481; G/6/413 (Huggard 418).

36. G/3/401 (A+G 194). Of course I would have been happier if in place of '...it is contingent, because neither I nor any other more enlightened mind could demonstrate that the opposite of this truth implies a contradiction,' Leibniz had written — it is contingent, because its opposite does not imply a contradiction. But philosophers do not write with an eye to making life easy for subsequent historians.

37. I think that Leibniz's frequent remarks about choices always being brought about by motives that incline without necessitating also point to the same conclusion. It is clear that the necessitating that is claimed not to ensue is metaphysical necessitating. Moreover, it is clear that Leibniz was not just making the claim that it is not metaphysically necessary that the choice occur; he was claiming that the conditional — if agent S has motives $m_1...m_n$ in circumstances K then S makes choice C — is not metaphysically necessary. See, for example, a letter of Leibniz to Jaquelot (G/6/571), paragraph 8 of Leibniz's fifth letter to Clarke (G/7/390 (ed. Alexander, *The Leibniz-Clarke Correspondence*, 57)) and NE 175, 178-79, for some confirmation. Furthermore, it seems equally clear that in these passages Leibniz assumed that metaphysical necessitating is all the necessitating that needs to be warded off in order to preserve freedom.

38. *Oeuvres de Messire Antoine Arnauld...*, Paris: 1775-1783. Reprint. Brussels, Culture et Civilisation, 1967: vol. 39, page 301.

39. *Ibid.*, p. 316. I am indebted to Professor Elmar Kremer for bringing these passages to my attention.

40. There is a deep and penetrating discussion of these issues in Michael J. Murray, "The Second Leibnizian Labyrinth: Psychology, Theology, and Freedom," his Ph.D. dissertation, University of Notre Dame, 1991. Murray, like Paull, comes to a different conclusion from the one I am advocating. See his article "Leibniz on Divine Foreknowledge of Future Contingents and Human Freedom," forthcoming in *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*.

41. *Concordia* 14.

42. C25.

43. *Ibid.*, In criticizing the same formulation of Molina's account of freedom, Banez noted that it is not to be found in Aristotle, the Master of Sentences, or Thomas. See *Tractatus* 357.

44. Here is a small sample of texts where Leibniz made this claim: A/6/3/132, G/1/148 (L204), Grua 276-77, A/2/1/514-15, G/3/402(A+G 194), Grua 479, and G/2/420, where Leibniz wrote to the Jesuit, Des Bosses:

I maintain absolutely that the power of determining oneself without a cause, i.e., without a source of the determination, implies a contradiction just as a relation without a foundation implies a contradiction. But, from this, the metaphysical necessity of every effect does not follow. For it suffices that the cause or reason not be metaphysically necessitating, although it is metaphysically necessary that there be such a cause.

45. There may be features in Molina's metaphysics that imply the possibility of equipoise, but his account of freedom has no such implication.

46. G/6/434 (Huggard 439-440).

47. A famous case occurs in DM 13 where Leibniz set out to meet the objection that if the concept of each individual substance is complete then each individual substance has all its properties necessarily.

48. VE 71 (LH IV 6, 12f B 14). The same point is a crucial premiss in Leibniz's argument against middle knowledge in "Scientia Media," see C25.

49. For a discussion of these issues, see Sleight, *Leibniz and Arnauld*, chapter six.

50. See, for example, LH I XVIII, 22.

51. Grua 358. The underlining is mine. The words underlined, i.e., 'from which it does follow,' are offered in place of 'ex quibus non sequitur.' You don't need to know much Latin to have reservations about my offering, as a translation. I am supposing that Leibniz miswrote and that his intention is captured by my replacement. This passage is translated by Benson Mates in "Individuals and Modality in the Philosophy of Leibniz," *Studia Leibnitiana*, 1972, p. 105. Mates translates the relevant phrase as I do and says of Leibniz's version "...this, so far as I can see, must be an error." My hope was that the error belonged to the editor Gaston Grua, but an inspection of the original, handwritten text has convinced me that the error belongs to Leibniz. You may think that it belongs to Mates and Sleight.

52. This aspect of Leibniz's treatment of counterfactual conditionals may be elaborated in at least two ways. First, we may assume his view to be that from all eternity God willed that were such and such conditions actual then such and such laws would obtain, or, second, we may assume his view to be that from all eternity God knew that were such and such conditions actual then he would have willed that such and such laws obtain. On either alternative God's knowledge of the truth of a counterfactual conditional of freedom is self-knowledge in the relevant sense.

53. What I know about Molina and Banez I learned from Fred Freddoso at the University of Notre Dame. If I did not get it straight, the fault rests with the student, not the teacher. I also express my gratitude to the following colleagues who discussed these matters with me: Andrew Black, Jack Davidson, Michael Griffin, Cranston Paull, Reginald Savage, and Brian Skelly. I am grateful to the following who read and criticized early versions of the paper: Jan Cover, Graeme Hunter, and Michael Murray. Aspects of early versions of the paper were presented to the Philosophy Department at Columbia University, and to the Catholic University of America Conference on Hispanic Philosophy in the Age of Discovery, and to the Duke University Conference on Logic and Metaphysics in Ancient and Early Modern Philosophy. I learned from the comments offered on these occasions. Some of the research for the paper was accomplished while I was supported by a National Endowment for the Humanities Fellowship for University Teachers, for which I am grateful.